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Representations of Europe and the Nation:  
How do Spaniards see themselves as Nationals and Europeans?
ϕ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The core theme of this article is the relation between citizens’ national identity and their 
European identity.  After the European Union (EU) launched a series of policies aimed 
at creating a European identity at the end of the 1980s, the member states responded by 
including a paragraph in the Maastricht Treaty specifying that the Union should respect 
member states’ national identities (Article F, point 1). This reaction, along with the 
introduction of the principle of subsidiarity and the rejection of the word “Federal”, 
suggested that many member states saw the creation of a European identity as a 
potential threat to their own national identities and their citizens’ national loyalties. 
Indeed, in the early 1990s national identity was used by the political elites as a means of 
justifying the right to independent statehood and sovereignty. Due to the close links 
between national identity and national independence, many scholars have argued that 
the European integration process could be seen as a threat to national identity (Höjelid 
2001), and hence difficult to achieve.   
 
  A concept of identity, based on the existence of pre-political cultural groups 
(sharing cultural heritage, language, myths and symbols), as used by authors such as 
Smith (1992, 1999) and Østerud (1999) entails an almost “necessary” incompatibility 
between ethno-cultural national identities and a European identity. This alleged 
incompatibility derives from the idea that a hypothetical European identity would be 
founded on elements similar to those which gave birth to the national identities in the 
context of the formation of modern nation-states.  However, as Smith sees it, the 
emergence of such a European identity is, at best, a difficult process, since Europe lacks 
myths and symbols that might wield “the people” of Europe into a cohesive whole.   
 
  In fact, however, European and national identities seem to coexist. Various 
Eurobarometer surveys have shown that sentiments of European identity are expressed 
alongside those of national identity. In other words, European identity does not appear 
to replace, or compete with, national identity. There are several possible explanations 
for this. An optimistic view of the possibilities for the future development of a European 
identity maintains that this could be based either on calculated individual self-interest 
                                                             
ϕ I am in debt to many people for their valuable comments and criticism to this article and earlier papers 
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thank all the participants at both meetings for their suggestions.  Finally, this paper was made possible by 
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(Gabel 1998; Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001; Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-
Cuenca 2001)
1 or on voluntary agreement over rules for peaceful, political co-existence, 
shared cultural norms and beliefs (Mancini 1998:8; Weiler 1999: 346; Kersbergen 
1997), as opposed to the ethno-cultural elements that are more generally associated with 
national identities. Some authors see the increasing globalization of communications 
and the economy as fuelling a decline in popular interest in strictly national issues and 
increasing identification with transnational developments (Cerutti 1992). Others, such 
as Moravscik (1998) and Millward (1992), in contrast, conclude that the EU integration 
process actually strengthens the nation-state. 
 
  Any discussion of the compatibility or otherwise of national and European 
identities should be informed by the recognition that individuals can hold multiple 
identities.  Most of the authors mentioned above would admit this possibility. Some, 
however, would insist on distinguishing between individual and collective identities.  In 
their view, while people can easily hold more than one individual identity (such as 
being a woman or of color), collective identities (such as national identities) are 
pervasive and persistent, implying that it is more difficult for more than one identity to 
be held at the same time or to change from one to another.  Without defending that 
distinction, other authors have also pointed that people can share multiple demoi, each 
deriving from the same source of human attachment (something like “concentric 
circles” with different levels of intensity), or feel simultaneously attached to multiple 
demoi based on different subjective factors of identification. 
 
  Most of the theories mentioned above have been developed in the absence of 
corresponding empirical research. This article presents an empirical analysis of 
European and national identities in Spain and of the core elements of these 
identifications (ethno-cultural, civic, instrumental, symbolic-affective). More 
specifically, the article examines the extent to which national loyalty and identification 
with Europe and/or the EU are mutually exclusive, or whether they are compatible and 
intertwined with one another. It also considers the content of national and European 
identifications, evaluating the relevance of different elements in the representation of 
the nation and Europe. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
This article combines the qualitative analysis of 24 interviews with the quantitative 
study of three batteries of questions included in the standard Eurobarometer 57.2. Both 
data sources were specifically designed by the EURONAT international research group
2 
to provide answers to exactly the type of questions posed in the Introduction.    
 
  The Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 (Spring 2002) contains one battery of 
questions measuring closeness to different in-groups and out-groups (including the 
                                                             
1 These researchers have focused on the variable “support for the EU integration”.  However, since there 
is a strong correlation between feeling European and supporting the EU, it is reasonable to think that what 
these authors have to say about support for integration also tells us something about European identities.  
On the other hand, their work is more empirical than the other research cited here. 
2 This is the acronym for the project “Representations of Europe and the nation in current and prospective 
member-states: media, elite and civil society”, financed by the EU (European Commission Research DG, 
Key Action Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base, contract No. HPSE-CT2001-00044).  
 
2  
nation, the EU, Europe and Central and Eastern Europe), as well as two batteries of 
questions measuring the most important elements of respondents’ identification with the 
nation and Europe.  Details about the samples can be found in the codebook 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/  http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html  
 
  We will use measures of closeness to fellow nationals and closeness to EU 
citizens and Europeans as indicators of national and European identities.  Closeness 
entails a sense of belonging to a community, and is “neutral” in that it does not imply 
that any of the possible components of identity mentioned in the previous section are 
assigned more importance than the others.   
 
  The two batteries of questions measuring the elements perceived as most 
relevant for identification with the nation and Europe include a set of 14 items, each 
relating to the different conceptions of identity mentioned in the Introduction.  In the 
case of national identity, common culture, customs and traditions, common language, 
common ancestry and common history and destiny are clearly related to an ethnic-
cultural conception of identity; common rights and duties and common political and 
legal systems are linked to a civic conception; a common system of social 
security/welfare is associated with an economic-instrumental notion of identity, as too, 
probably are national economy, national army and common borders. Other elements, 
such as national independence and sovereignty, national pride, national character and 
national symbols could be defined as implying a mainly affective-symbolic notion of 
identity. A similar classification of items can also be made in the case of European 
identity. A sense of sharing a common civilization, of belonging to a European society 
with many languages and cultures, a common ancestry and common history and destiny 
refer to the ethno-cultural components of identity; emerging common political and legal 
systems and common rights and duties relate more to a civic conception; a common 
system of social protection and the right to freedom of movement and residence are 
linked to an instrumental conceptualization of identity, as too, probably, are the 
emerging European union defense system, common borders and the single currency.
3  
Pride in being European, European sovereignty, or the European Union and a set of EU 
symbols are more affective-symbolic. 
 
  In these last batteries of questions, the respondent had the option to respond “I 
do not feel national/European”. In such cases, the interviewer did not proceed with the 
remaining questions in each battery.  Qualitative interviews were carried out with 
Spanish ordinary citizens in Madrid between January and May 2003.  The sample was 
selected taking into account respondents’ gender, the population of their place of 
residence, educational level, and personal experience in terms of having lived, worked 
or studied in another EU member state (for at least one year). Interviews took between 
35 and 55 minutes and were semi-structured. The interviewer started by explaining what 
the interview was about, emphasizing that the researchers were interested in the 
respondents’ feelings, opinions and experiences, rather than their knowledge. 
                                                             
3 These items could also have an important affective-symbolic dimension.  More specifically, a single 
European currency may have a strong symbolic value “because a country’s money is a symbol of its 
sovereignty.  Support for the EMU and the euro is a crucial test case for whether and why European 
citizens may be willing to transfer power from the nation-state to European institutions, and it has 
important implications for the future direction of institution-building within the European Union” 
(Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001: 141). 
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Respondents were also directly asked if and why they felt Spanish and/or European.  
Respondents were invited to give their general opinions about Europe and the EU.   
Following on from these very general topics, the interviewer raised particular issues if 
these had been mentioned spontaneously during the initial responses.  The interviewer 
abided by the respondents’ narratives and adapted the order and type of questions to the 
needs of each of the individual interviewees. 
   
  The interviews were transcribed and then analyzed using content analysis 
techniques assisted by appropriate qualitative analysis computer software (ATLAS/ti).  
In this research, the content of interviews are treated as a partial reflection of an 
objective reality which is nevertheless mediated by the social context that the 
respondents were talking about. We do not assume that our respondents constitute a 
representative sample of Spanish citizens on the variables on which they have been 
selected.  Indeed, our aim was to maximize the possibility of different discourses 
emerging. Nevertheless we consider that these variables may have an impact on our 
respondents’ perceptions, feelings, discursive tactics, etc., which is also explored in this 
article. We do not posit the validity of our findings other than for our sample, but we do 
consider the congruencies between our survey data and interview data which reinforce 
each another, and therefore, boost the reliability and validity of the findings. 
 
Being Spanish 
 
When asked why they felt Spanish, only a small minority (2.8 percent) of our 
quantitative survey respondents stated that they did not feel so.  Accordingly, most of 
our qualitative interview respondents declared that they did feel Spanish, linking this 
feeling to the territory (Spain) where they were born or have lived most of their lives.  
However, immediately after stating their identity, a large majority used the conjunction 
“but” to reject any link with “nationalism” or “patriotism”.  In our opinion, this 
behavior is due to the fact that Spanish nationalism is identified with the country’s 
recent authoritarian past. Because of the Francoist dictatorship, and the abuse of 
Spanish nationalism both to curtail Spaniards’ political and civil rights, but also to deny 
a national identity and cultural rights to Basques and Catalonians, a majority of 
Spaniards feel uneasy about any kind of praise of the Spanish nation, its national 
symbols or its historical achievements. Therefore, the representation of Spain is not 
easy for many Spaniards, who constantly feel obliged to draw a distinction between 
(legitimate) national pride and (old-fashioned) nationalism (see Ruiz Jiménez 2002). 
 
(…) I feel Spanish because I was born here and I speak Spanish, but I do not feel 
Spaniard in the typical sense of the word (ea1). 
(…) I feel Spaniard because I was born in Spain, but I do not feel…, it is my 
country and I am proud of my country, I like my country, I like where I live (…); 
well, there is also another, different type of identification with the mother country, 
but I do not practice it (ea2). 
(…) I do feel Spanish and I have a Spanish identity, but I am also critical of Spain 
(ea12). 
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[To feel Spanish] is an honor, it is where you are born, and where you have your 
roots, and where you have formed your family; and you feel proud of where you 
live, who you live with and with the people you live with (…).  It seems that people  
are ashamed to say that they are Spaniards (ea18). 
 
[You feel Spanish] because you were born here and you fight…, a little bit, for your 
country, and if there were a conflict, or whatever, you would fight for what is yours 
(…) (ea23). 
 
Some people declared that they did not feel Spanish at all, but as was also the 
case in our quantitative survey, they represented only a small minority.  In some cases, 
we could interpret this as indicating their stronger negative image and rejection of 
nationalism.  Those who did feel Spanish conceded similarly great importance to all the 
items of national identification tested in our quantitative survey research.   
 
Nevertheless, Table 1 and Figure 1 show that our survey was able to capture 
small but significant differences among items. Thus, common culture, customs and 
traditions, in the first place,  and common language, second, were the items agreed to be 
most important for national identification; in contrast, national army, national 
independence and sovereignty, national pride and national symbols, were held to be a 
little less important.  These latter elements are deeply linked in Spaniards’ consciences 
with the country’s authoritarian past which is strongly rejected in Spain.  Civic 
components of national identities (common rights and duties in our survey), emphasized 
by contemporary Spanish elites, are also important for Spanish citizens, over and above 
other ethno-cultural elements such as common ancestries or history. In the context of 
the theories discussed in the Introduction, Spanish identity would be defined by a 
mixture of ethno-cultural and civic elements and the lesser importance of symbolic 
components. 
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Table 1.  Meanings of National Identity in Spain 
                (Eurobarometer 57.2, 2002)
1 
  Strongly 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree
Tend 
to 
agree 
Strongly 
agree   
  1 2 3  4 mean
2)  A common culture, customs and  
      traditions  2 6 43  50  3.39 
3)  A common language  2  6  36  56  3.47 
4)  Common ancestry  2  10  42  46  3.31 
5) A common history and common 
     destiny  3 10  42  45  3.29 
6) A common political and legal 
     system  4 11  41  44  3.26 
7)  Common rights and duties  3  7  40  50  3.37 
8) A common system of social   
     security/welfare  3 8 40  48  3.33 
9)  A national economy  3  13  38  46  3.27 
10) A national army  8  13  37  42  3.13 
11) Common borders  3  6  40  51  3.39 
12) A feeling of national pride  8  14  36  42  3.12 
13) National independence and 
       sovereignty   7 14  38  40  3.11 
14)  Our national character  5  8  38  50  3.32 
15)  Our national symbols (the flag, the
        national anthem, etc.)  10 13 36  42 3.09 
1,  Frequency distribution (in percentages) and mean of items in question Q.26   
(Different  things  or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to a 
nation. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? "I feel (SPANISH) 
because I share with my fellow (SPANIARDS)…”). 
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 57.2. 
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Figure 1.  Spaniards' net agreement with the importance of diferent items for 
their national identification
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  We also asked our qualitative interviewees why they felt Spanish. Reflecting the 
strong presence of national stereotypes, our respondents identified the “Spanish way of 
life” as the strongest determinant of Spanish identity.  The answers enabled us to clarify 
the meaning of the item common culture, customs and traditions in our survey research.  
This way of life could be summarized as a leisure culture, the main feature of which 
would be the understanding that work is an instrument to obtain the resources needed to 
live a happy, easy, care-free life.  From this perspective, the fundamental objective 
seems to be the use and enjoyment of time spent outside the workplace.  In accordance 
with this particular way of life, our interviewees divided Europe into two different 
“cultural spheres”; they feel closer to the Mediterranean geographical area, while they 
perceive Northern European countries (including France) as belonging to a different 
sphere.  They identify Northern Europe, again resorting to widely-available stereotypes, 
as a region in which private life (lived out in the domestic space) takes precedence over 
public life (social relations outside the workplace or home), and also as one in which 
working life takes precedence over the enjoyment of free time; Northern Europeans are 
seen as more “sober”, “serious” and “austere”.  
 
(…) We know how to live, that stereotype, “Spaniards know how to live”, that is 
true, we know how to live.  When you see countries where at six in the afternoon 
(…) it is already night, that there is no life, that there is no happiness, that 
everything is dead, you go to bars and everywhere is empty (…). We live very well 
[in Spain] (ea3).  
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(…) They are less open, they are cold, they do not develop strong relations, there are 
even neighbors, neighbors, who do not talk to each other, they have different 
schedules, they go to bed early, at night almost everyone is already in bed.  (…) 
They do not know how to enjoy life as we do here [in Spain] (ea7).   
When I say Spanish I should say Mediterranean instead, that is, I would respond “I 
am Mediterranean”, if that were possible.  I even see a difference within the 
European Union between Mediterranean countries and non-Mediterranean countries, 
big cultural differences (…) (ea9). 
You have to consider how we eat, the hot weather, the people in the streets, in the 
bars  (ea24).  
  
  Language is also an element that found a strong consensus among the qualitative 
interviewees when it  came to specifying  what made them feel Spanish.  It was also the 
second most important element in our survey research.  Again, however, our 
respondents emphasized Spain’s linguistic diversity, which they said they accepted and 
respected, as opposed to what happened during the dictatorship.    
 
(…) I feel Spanish because (…) I speak Spanish (ea1). 
 
(…) Language is almost the strongest element in forming your identity (…), and, 
besides, I think also that, obviously, the literature…(…).  The language is something 
that will mark you during your whole life, and wherever you go, when you are in a 
foreign country and you find a fellow Spaniard it is a signal of identity (ea11). 
When I speak about a language, I mean Castilian; I respect other minor languages 
spoken in Spain, but I think that Castilian is our language, and that this must be 
Castilian, and the Castilian language is very important, it is spoken by millions of 
people around the world and we should look after it better than we actually do, 
because we are using more and more English words all the time (ea13). 
  
  In contrast to these elements above, but in line with the results of our 
quantitative survey, most of our qualitative interviewees found it difficult to identify 
with national symbols (the flag or anthem).  Even if they acknowledge that these 
symbols do represent Spain, they are associated with a series of historical and 
ideological elements (specifically, to the Francoist dictatorship and, more particularly, 
to the victors in the Spanish Civil War) that make it difficult for our interviewees to 
identify with these symbols. Only in a few concrete situations, both the flag and the 
anthem, work as collective symbols of identification for all Spaniards.  That is, 
specially, when Spanish citizens are in a foreign country or when Spain is competing in 
international sports events. 
 
Maybe in a sports competition (…), sport is the only thing which is related to the 
anthem and with the flag (…).  I am aware that it is a symbol and in some countries 
patriotism is more sentimental, but, for some reason, in Spain (…) patriotism has 
nothing to do with the motherland (ea1). 
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As a symbolic icon [the flag], I do not think that it means the same as in other 
countries.  I mean, I have lived in the US and for them the flag is their icon, it is the 
most important thing (…).  It is not the same thing with the Spanish flag.  I agree 
that it is my flag and I respect it but (…) we have not been taught to love our flag 
(…).  The Spanish anthem is linked to the political Right alone, and only the Right 
(ea3). 
I don’t think it is very important, I know the anthem (…) but it is not a patriotic 
thing (…).  And same goes for the flag, (…) outside Spain maybe (…), but you 
know that in your own country you don’t have to show anyone, you don’t have to 
brag about it (ea19). 
The problem with the Spanish flag, obviously, is that it is identified with the 
political Right, but the Spanish flag is not of the Right, it is the flag of Spain.  But 
the thing, clearly, is that it has been the flag of the Right for such a long time that it 
is still identified as such (…) (ea24). 
Even a member of the Civil Guard (a militarized police force dependent on the army) 
stated: 
 
I could tell you something, and I might be doing wrong by saying this given my job, 
but I do not feel those things [the flag and anthem] (…).  When I am abroad and I 
hear the Spanish national anthem, then I feel warm inside (…) and when you see the 
flag (…).  But then, now I am here [in Spain] and I do not pay attention to them 
(…).  To me, symbols are meaningless (ea7). 
  
  In short, both qualitative interview and quantitative survey respondents 
coincided in stressing various ethno-cultural elements as the main basis for their 
national identity (common culture, customs and traditions, as well as a common 
language). At the same time, they dismissed symbolic components (the flag and 
anthem) as the least important.  Civic components of identities were given medium 
level importance in our survey research, but were not mentioned in our interviews. 
 
Being European  
 
 At the same time and at no cost?  
 
Asked why did they feel European, only a small minority (3.1 percent) of our 
quantitative survey respondents stated that they did not feel so. This implies that most of 
them felt Spanish and Europeans at one and the same time. In fact, the cross-tabulation 
of closeness to different groups of people shows that Spanish citizens see national and 
European identities as being compatible, some 61 percent of the respondents stating that 
they feel simultaneously very close to their fellow nationals and to Europeans.  There is 
also a positive correlation (taub_b r = .277**) between pride in being Spanish and pride 
in being European.
4  Belot (2003) has also used qualitative data to show that younger 
people who have a positive image of their own countries find it easier to identify 
simultaneously with Europe than those who do not. Nevertheless, in comparative terms, 
Spaniards are still more attached to their national identity than their European identity, 
                                                             
4 Eurobarometer 57.1 (Spring 2002). 
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with an index of 0.718.
5  That is, ties to the nation are still seen as stronger than bonds 
to Europe, thereby giving support to the theory of concentric circles of identification 
mentioned in the Introduction.  
 
  Our qualitative interviews show surprisingly similar results. Most of our 
respondents stated that they did feel European. Most declare themselves to be 
Europeans when distinguishing themselves from people from other countries or 
cultures, or when their national identity feels too narrow.  Nevertheless, their European 
identity was almost always identified as secondary or weaker than interviewees’ 
national, Spanish identity.  But both were also considered compatible. 
 
(...) I feel Spanish, but European too.  First, I consider myself Spaniard, one hundred 
per cent (…) and then I consider myself European.  Yes, I also feel European, but 
that feeling does not have deep roots (…) (ea3). 
(…) First you go through your country and then comes Europe (…).  Before 
European [I feel] Spanish (ea5). 
First and foremost I feel Spanish, over…, yes, I feel European because that is 
obvious, we are in Europe, we belong to Europe (…). I am a European citizen, but 
before that, I am a Spanish citizen, that is, I think you must place “I feel Spanish” 
before “European”, because I share more things with Spaniards than with Europeans 
(…) (ea13). 
I feel Spanish, but that does not mean that I do not feel European, that is, I… I do 
not use my identity as an obstacle, to distinguish myself from others (ea15). 
  
  As for the potential threat that the emergence of a European identity might 
represent for national identity and loyalty to the nation, the qualitative interviews 
provide us with more information than our survey research.  The process of European 
integration is seen in different ways. For some interviewees it is as a potentially 
enriching process, while for others it represents a threat to national identity.  The latter 
link this danger more generally to the supposed impact of cultural and economic 
globalization on Spain and Europe. 
 
(…) It  [the EU] could enrich us.  It is up to us to maintain, or not to maintain, our 
Spanish traditions.  If we allow different ways of life, that would damage ours, to 
seduce us, I don’t know, like swapping our customs of sitting down together at the 
table for one hour and having a half an hour nap for fast food…  Because that 
depends on us and, besides, that is not European, it is American, that is, it is up to us 
(ea2). 
I think that probably we will be losing things that are basic, such as our origins, each 
country’s traditions, won’t we, if we are adding slowly?  In fact, in the Spanish 
language, you can see it happening, little by little in the dictionary there are more 
and more English words, you know?  Therefore I think that fundamental things will 
be lost (ea7). 
                                                             
5 This is the median value obtained on subtracting the median identification with the EU from the median 
identification with the nation. A positive value indicates that attachment to the nation is stronger than 
attachment to the EU. 
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I think that there must be a European identity, but I also regret it, and I think that 
this…, clearly this is only the education that I have received, I regret that the 
Spanish identity will be lost, in the sense that, if everything, is globalized, if 
everything is Europeanized, if everything… (…).  But I think that it is necessary to 
have a sense of being  European (…) if that implies losing our Spanish identity, I do 
not know; I mean, I think that we will feel more European, and we will be 
European, as times goes on, nevertheless I think that Spain will resist the idea of 
losing its Spanish identity (ea10).  
  
  The disappearance of the national currency, in particular and contrary to the 
situation in other countries (above all the UK), is not experienced as a threat to national 
sovereignty or independence.  The peseta is missed only in some cases because it is still 
easier for some Spaniards to make calculation in the old currency. 
 
I do not think that anyone feels tied sentimentally…, although it could happen 
because we are peculiar, -  to his/her currency; that is, I think it means absolutely 
nothing, I do not think it has the same significance as a language (ea10). 
Mental calculations are still done in pesetas and so I still have it in my mind, but I 
do not miss it.  In the end the currency is only a way of paying for things and 
nothing more, to me it doesn’t matter if notes are one colour or another (ea13). 
It is not that I miss it, it is that we are used to it (…), maybe older people would 
have more problems (ea17). 
  This kind of discourse, in which European identities are not seen as a threat to 
Spanish identity or loyalty to the state, accords with the messages given by Spain’s 
political elites (Jaúregui 2002; Ruiz Jiménez 2002), which may of course have 
influenced citizens’ opinions.  During the transition to democracy, joining the EU was 
seen as a means of leaving the past behind, breaking out of economic and cultural 
backwardness and isolation; Spain’s largest political parties, the Socialist PSOE and the 
conservative PP, have both based much of their prestige and propaganda on their 
“successes” within Europe (this is the case, for example, of the PP with respect to 
Spain’s membership of the common currency). 
 
What does it mean to be European? 
 
As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 2, those who did identify themselves as Europeans 
in our quantitative survey research distinguished between a small set of items 
considered important for their European identification, and another larger set of items 
with less bearing on this identity.   
 
  According to the findings shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, the most important 
dimension of citizens’ representations of Europe is the economic one. The single 
currency, followed by freedom of movement and residence throughout the EU, are the 
two most important items in Spaniards’ identification with their fellow Europeans. This 
accords with the conclusions of a recent qualitative study on perceptions of the EU 
carried out by the European Commission (2001: 58).  Rights and duties also figure 
prominently among the components of Spanish citizens’ identification with Europe 
(Table 2), which is congruent with the important role that the democratic elites have  
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assigned to European integration as a means of modernizing the country and 
consolidating democracy during the transition period (Jaúregui 2002). In contrast, 
symbolic elements are far less significant. Common ancestry, European symbols and 
pride in being European are the items considered least important for Spaniards’ 
identification with Europe.  In relation to the theories discussed in the Introduction, this 
finding provides evidence in favor of the idea that attachment to different identities is 
more feasible when they derive from different sources. In this case, European identity is 
basically instrumental, while national identity is more ethnic-cultural.  The importance 
of civic elements in both kinds of identities is also relevant when accounting for the 
compatibility between them.
6 
 
Table 2.  Meanings of European Identity among Spaniards 
(Eurobarometer 57.2., 2002)
1 
  Strongly 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree
Tend 
to 
agree
Strongly 
agree   
 1  2  3  4  Mean
2)  A common civilization   6  20  56  17  2.84 
3)  Membership of a European society 
     with many languages and cultures  5 17  56  22  2.95 
4)  Common ancestry  11  35  42  12  2.56 
5)  A common history  and a common 
     Destiny  8 29  48  15  2.69 
6) The EU institutions and an    
     emerging common political  
    and legal system 
7 22  53  18  2.82 
7)  Common rights and duties  5  19  54  22  2.93 
8) Common system of social 
     protection within the EU  8 22  51  20  2.82 
9)  The right to free movement and 
      residence in any part of the EU  5 14  51  30  3.07 
10) An emerging EU defense system  8  21  52  19  2.82 
11)  Common borders  6  22  52  20  2.85 
12) A feeling of pride in being 
       European  11 31 44  13 2.59 
13) Sovereignty of the EU  10  29  47  13  2.63 
14) A common EU currency   5  11  50  34  3.13 
15) A set of EU symbols (flag, 
        Anthem, etc.)  15 29 43  13 2.53 
1, Frequency distribution (in percentages) and mean of items in question Q.27  
(“Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to Europe. To what extent 
do you agree with the following statements?  "I feel European because I share with my fellow 
Europeans …").  Source: Eurobarometer 57.2. 
 
                                                             
6 Ruiz Jiménez et a.l (2004) have shown an interesting positive correlation between the importance of 
civic elements both for national and European identities and a greater compatibility.  Thus, Italy and 
Spain are the two countries with the highest proportion of citizens who mentioned civic elements among 
the five most important elements for their national as well as their European identity, and they are also the 
countries where the net percentage of population with dual identities is highest. 
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Figure 2.  Spaniards' net agreement with the importance of different 
components of their European identity
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  Our qualitative interview research helped us clarify what the respondents were 
thinking about when they answered the questions about the most important elements for 
their European identification. From our qualitative interviews it is clear that most people 
distinguish between Europe and the EU.  Few people use both terms as synonyms, and 
those who do are mainly those who are less knowledgeable about the EU.  Nevertheless, 
most of the interviewees, when thinking about this question, saw Europe as a larger, 
earlier and different entity to the EU.  Europe was perceived in more historical and 
cultural terms, while the EU is mainly understood as an economic and political project 
promoted by the political elites with the aim of competing with the United States.  
 
Europe is a continent, a group of countries (…) I think it is the cradle of civilization, 
isn’t it? from where all the ideas that have later spread throughout the world have 
come from. (…)  The EU is a group of countries with several agreements (…).  
There are European countries which do not belong to the EU (ea2). 
I think that the EU is more a project, and specially at this moment in time, is a 
project to compete with the US (…)  and, in contrast, Europe, in my head, is a much 
more beautiful idea that implies culture, history, the origin of civilization (…) 
(ea10). 
The EU does not cover the whole of Europe (…).  Not all the countries that belong 
to Europe belong to the EU, as a personal experience, people who belong to the EU 
have rights and advantages  (ea12). 
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Europe is a larger concept.  The EU, well, somehow, it has more economic 
connotations (…).  Historically Europe consists of more countries than the EU now 
has (…).  Eastern countries have always been part of Europe, thus… simply, there 
are more people and more countries in Europe than in the EU (ea19). 
Europe does not suggest to me the EU, on the contrary, Europe is larger (…).  There 
are Eastern countries, Russia, I don’t know, it is much more larger (…).  The idea 
would be that all will join the EU, but that would take a long time… (ea21). 
  It seems, therefore, that our quantitative survey respondents were speaking as 
citizens of the EU when stressing the economic dimension of their European identity.  
In this sense, our qualitative interview study also shows a conception of the EU as an 
economic and political project; the EU is seen as the construction of a new world power 
able to match the United States, and, in this sense, it is closely tied to the introduction of 
a common currency and the disappearance of internal borders.  The euro is perceived as 
a practical and logical consequence of a more integrated EU; it works as a symbol of 
collective identity at the same time as it allows Europe to compete economically with 
the United States.  The disappearance of borders has less symbolic meaning, but is also 
seen as another practical and logical consequence of the European integration process. 
 
The euro has been an important  stepping stone in the [construction] of European 
identity because now we indentify with a currency, it is the same as in the US, they 
also have a single currency, the dollar (ea6). 
This is a logical consequence, isn’t it?  If we want to build up a Union in the 
economy, in society, in everything, I think… (…).  Exactly the same as the US, 
which has the dollar, we could have a single currency that we tried earlier with the 
ECU (…) and I see this as a logical consequence (ea21). 
The EU implies many advantages: traveling freely, working in different countries 
(…) (ea10). 
  
  The perception of the EU in instrumental terms is further enhanced by the vision 
given of the European project by the Spanish media, which assigns it a primarily 
economic function. At the time, the launch of the euro, in particular, was presented as 
the tool that would bring economic growth and give Europe a leading role in the 
international arena (Ruiz Jiménez 2002).  This vision is shared by citizens, but not all 
the interview respondents who declared a European identity thought that their country, 
or they themselves, have benefited from EU membership. Instrumental and ethno-
cultural reasons are more mixed here than in our survey research.  In very general terms, 
our respondents valued the EU mainly because it had allowed Spain to overcome its 
isolation from Europe after the dictatorship and become a modern country; or they 
believe that things would be worse had Spain not entered the EU. 
 
If Spain were not…, if it were not…, then I don’t know, it would seem to me like 
when Spain was in the period when… when Franco was alive, totally isolated, 
economically as well as politically, structurally, I have lived through that period 
(…).  If Spain were not in the common market we would not belong to Europe, 
there would have been many more problems (ea3). 
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Precisely because of trade and because now really we do not feel isolated from other 
countries as before, before we were isolated (ea18). 
  
  However, on more practical issues, they think that Spain has only benefited from 
belonging to the EU with respect to the question of terrorism.  In other important areas 
of national interests (such as agriculture and fisheries, immigration or Spanish-Morocco 
relations) the opinions are mixed or clearly negative. 
 
In the Spanish countryside, in agriculture, Spain has had to concede a lot, to make 
too many concessions I think, in the agricultural field, to get into the Economic 
Union (ea1). 
I think that there are areas in which it has been damaging, for example, in 
agriculture (ea22). 
(…) It has damaged us, limiting traditional crops, such as wine, olive trees, etc., 
etc… hasn’t it?  (…).  If we were not in the EU we would not have had to sacrifice a 
lot of livestock, we could have [negotiated and reached agreement] again with 
[Morocco] (ea5). 
It is the Union which negotiates, but I don’t know, clearly, if they do it well or not, 
it seems that they do not negotiate very well and that this has damaged Spain [for 
example] in the fishing agreements with Morocco (ea18).  
  
  It is interesting to note that even though our interview respondents did not base 
their European identities on instrumental considerations alone, attaching some 
importance to some ethno-cultural components (identifying themselves as inhabitants of 
Europe rather than citizens of the EU), they still hold dual identities. This contradicts 
the hypothesis that European identities would not emerge as long as national ethno-
cultural identities remain strong. It also undermines the assumption that European 
identities cannot be based on ethno-cultural elements of identity. 
 
Conclusions 
 
First, the research carried out for this paper confirms the ethno-cultural basis of Spanish 
national identity. This, of course, comes as little surprise. More significant, perhaps, is 
the evidence, drawn from both survey and interview research, which highlights 
Spaniards’ uneasiness about Spanish nationalism and their negative identification with 
their national symbols, due to their linkage with our authoritarian past. Place of birth 
and residence, language, and common culture, customs and traditions (perceived in a 
rather stereotypical fashion) are the most important elements in Spaniards’ national 
identity.   
  
  Second, both the respondents to our survey and our interviewees consider that 
European and Spanish identities are compatible.  They also coincide in describing their 
European identity as secondary and weaker than their Spanish identity. Only a minority 
of our interview respondents considered that the development of a European identity 
might threaten national identity or sovereignty. 
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Third, and probably a more substantive conclusion, we explain this compatibility 
between these two identities, in part at least, because of the different sources of 
attachment to each identity. While national identity is mainly ethno-cultural (Smith 
1995), European identity (understood as being a citizen of the EU) is generally founded 
on instrumental considerations, supporting in part arguments put forward by authors 
such as Gabel (1998) and Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca (2001).  This 
argument was more strongly supported in our survey research. Our interviews, on the 
other hand, presented us with a more complex, but very interesting, picture. Our 
interview respondents distinguished between Europe, defined largely in historical and 
cultural terms, and the European Union, defined above all in instrumental terms.   
However, even when respondents recognized the importance of the benefits of different 
EU-level policies, their European identity was not based on those instrumental 
considerations alone. In fact, our respondents think that Spain has only benefited from 
EU membership in relation to the issue of terrorism. Opinions are divided or clearly 
negative with respect to other important national issues (including agriculture and 
fisheries, immigration or Spanish-Moroccan relations). 
 
  Therefore, we reject the argument put forward by authors such as Smith (1995, 
1999) and Østerud (1999), who have stressed that the emergence of a European identity 
would be difficult, if not impossible, as long as national ethnic-cultural identities remain 
strong.  In Spain, European and national identities are compatible even though national 
identity remains strong and based on ethno-cultural elements. As for the relation 
between them, we find support for the hypothesis of concentric circles of identification 
as well as for the hypothesis of attachment derived from different sources.  That is, our 
survey research suggests that Spaniards hold simultaneous identities, and that their 
attachments to each derive from different sources: above all from ethno-cultural 
elements, in the case of national identity, and instrumental components in the case of 
European identity (understood as being a  citizen of the EU).  Meanwhile, our 
interviewees showed dual identities, even though their European identities also had an 
important ethno-cultural dimension and they had a weaker instrumental sense of 
European identity (in this case understood mainly as being inhabitants of Europe). 
 
Although we found that instrumental considerations constitute quite a significant 
dimension of Spaniards’ European identity, our findings contradict the hypothesis put 
forward by Fernandez-Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca (2001) which states that the people 
who are most likely to display European identities are those who are disaffected with 
their national institutions. Our research also challenges the notion that the emergence of 
a European identity implies an erosion of national loyalties or identities (Davies 1996; 
Seton-Watson 1985; Wallace 1990; Papcke 1990; Llobera 1994; Deflem and Pample 
1996; Carey 2002).  As already mentioned, both in our survey and interview research, 
respondents’ attachment to the nation was stronger and more important than their 
European identities.  
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  These findings about the compatibility of Spaniards’ national and European 
identities should be seen in the light of Spain’s transition to democracy and the public 
discourse developed by political elites and disseminated by the mass media.  Europe has 
been seen in fairly positive terms as Spain’s “inspiring other”, both due to the 
democratic values that it would help to consolidate as well as the economic 
development that it would bring. Accordingly, elites have always defended the 
compatibility of Spanish and European identities and interests (Jaúregui 2002; Ruiz 
Jiménez 2002).  
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